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Pirates, Polities and Companies: Global Politics on the Konkan 
Littoral, c.1690-1756.  




 This paper examines pre-colonial interaction among polities along the 
Konkan coast, from Surat to Goa, during the long half-century c.1680-1756.  
Specifically it uses the dynasty of the Angrias, who were deemed pirates by the 
European powers but were actually an integral part of the Maratha 
Confederacy. Scholarship that has dealt with the Angrias has relied on 
historiography passed down through the English East India Company 
chroniclers and employees to colonial historians under the British Raj and 
carried into contemporary times. The result has been a continued Eurocentric 
interpretation of the Angrias that has obfuscated the geopolitical history of the 
region. This paper seeks to rectify the situation through a fresh look at British 
archival evidence coupled with scholarship that has examined the Indian and 
other European languages primary source material. The Angrias were not 
pirates preying on the vessels of other nations. Rather, they governed a section 
of the Marathan Confederacy and sought through a European institution to 
extend exercise sovereignty over their littoral. The East India Company was 
unwilling to cede any of their gains of maritime supremacy to the upstart 
Maratha maritime force.  This paper tells the story of how Angria and the East 
India Company interacted on equal terms through political negotiation, military 
comparative advantages, and a complex series and ever-changing network of 
alliances.   
 
 
It was now fifty years that this piratical state had rendered 
itself formidable to the trading ships of all the European 
nations in India, and the English East-India company had 
kept up a marine force at the annual expense of fifty 
thousand pounds to protect their own ships…for as no 
vessel could with prudence venture singly to pass by 
Angria’s domains… 
Robert Orme1 
                                                          
1  Robert Orme, A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, 
from the Year MDCCXVL to Which Is Prefixed a Dissertation on the Establishments 
Made by Mahomedan Conquerors in Indostan, vol. 1 (Madras: Pharoah & Co., 1861; 
reprint, 4th). p. 409. 
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1. Introduction  
 On May 24, 1724, William Phipps Governor of Bombay penned a 
response to Kanhoji Angria. He warned, “any state bordering upon a 
neighbour that lives on plunder and robs under colour of friendship must 
necessarily be careful for their defence.”2 Angria was, and had been 
careful for his defence. For over the past seven years the English East 
India Company (EIC) had launched five major attacks against Angria’s 
coastal forts.  All without success and all causing a great many more 
deaths among the invaders than the defenders. For thirty-eight years the 
EIC and the Angria dynasty fought a war along the Konkan littoral that 
has since been largely forgotten.  
The dynasty as a power and source of influence was established in 
1688 by Kanhoji who received from Sambhaji, the second emperor of the 
Maratha Confederacy, command of a coastal fort as a result of exemplary 
military service against the Mughals. Later he would rise to become the 
Sarkhail, or chief admiral in hereditary perpetuity. Upon Kanhoji’s death in 
June 1729, the dynasty fell to his oldest son, Sukhoji who ruled till his 
death in 1733. Another son, from the same wife, Sambhaji took over but 
the Angrian territories were divided when Sukhoji’s and Sambhaji’s half-
brother Manaji gained control of the northern Konkan in the area around 
Bombay in 1735. Sambhaji died in 1743 leaving the southern Konkan to 
another half-brother Tulaji3 who in 1756 would be captured by the 
Marathas during a joint military operation with the British and die in 
captivity several years later. 
                                                          
2 "Tarnslate [Sic.] of Conajee Angria's Letter to the President, Bombay Castle 24 May 
1724," in The Angreys of Kolaba in British Records (1719 A.D. To 1884 A.D.), ed. B.K. 
Shrivastavya (Poona: Prashant Printery, 1950). p. 10. 
3 Surendra Nath Sen, Early Career of Kanhoji Angria and Other Papers (Calcutta: 
Calcutta University Press, 1941). p. 21.  There is much confusion and contradiction in 
the historical record concerning Kanhoji’s progeny.  Nath Sen bases his information on 
a contemporary Marathi chronicle and “official family history” as the line still exists.  I 
have therefore taken this to be the most authoritative source. 
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 A case study of the Angrias contributes to a larger framework of 
scholarship on early modern geopolitical interaction between European 
and South Asian polities as well as raises questions on how sovereignty 
is embodied and recognised by various political entities. The Angrias are 
ideal as a point of departure because they were the leading thalassocracy 
in the region surpassing the Siddis,4 Portuguese, Dutch, and effectively 
challenging the EIC for over fifty years. Yet the Angrias have been 
continuously misrepresented or simplified in narratives and scholarship. 
Thus, what was an intricately complex story of indigenous rulers 
exercising various degrees of maritime sovereignty over time became a 
smooth tale of pirates challenging the European companies by preying on 
their commerce. Most fundamentally, the case advocates for a pre-
colonial model of state interaction based upon negotiation and alliances, 
placing south Asians at the centre of what has always been primarily an 
Indian story, rather than the traditional tale of the rise-of-the-EIC imposing 
its will in a top-down fashion.  To borrow from David Abernathy, the 
typical story of empire and colonialism is one where “it is the fate of the 
colonized not to act but to be acted upon, not to take initiative but to 
respond to initiatives taken by the invader.”5 The Angrias, offer a prime 
example of how wrong can be the ‘typical story.’ If anything, their story 
demonstrates how these roles were reversed and how it was the EIC who 
reacted against the initiatives of the Maratha admiral Kanhoji. 
Additionally, this study also hopes to contribute to a better understanding 
of Maratha politics at the federal level through an examination of one of 
its most important families.  
                                                          
4 Known for their seafaring capabilities the Siddis were a group of seafarers of 
Abyssinian decent who were known for acting as the Mughal admiralty.  They were 
based in Janjira seventy kilometres south of Bombay and were frequently in conflict 
with the Angrias and Marathas. 
5 David Abernathy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 
1415-1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). p. 30. 
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 As a corollary, this study brings into question misapplied, yet 
popular, conceptualisations of the ‘pirate.’ The paper contends that due to 
the absence of a pirate taxonomy that goes beyond the pirate/privateer 
distinction, the Angrias have been misrepresented in history simply 
because they stopped, and sometimes seized, shipping along their coast 
in an effort to extend the territorial claims over their coastline. As will 
become clear through the narrative, the historical definitions of ‘pirate’ 
and ‘piracy’ do not accurately describe the majority of the Angrias or their 
actions. This issue will be raised again further along in the argument.  
  
1.1 Literature Review 
 In their day the Angrias were infamous, even serving as the basic 
characterisation of a pirate in an essay by Enlightenment philosopher 
David Hume.6 Since then however, the Angrias have fallen into relative 
obscurity. Consistent misrepresentation of them as mere maritime 
predators not only allowed the EIC to act aggressively against the 
Marathas when it was convenient for them to do so, but has led to 
distortion in the historical record; first through the colonial scholarship 
which uncritically carried forward Company opinion and has subsequently 
been adopted into current scholarship. Even in their own time, if the 
Angrias were not being mythologised by Maratha chroniclers they were 
being vilified by European adventurers in picaresque narratives and 
lambasted by the companies’ officials.  
 Throughout the nineteenth century, the historians most interested 
in Angria were British colonial agents who uncritically continued toting the 
                                                          
6 David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. 
Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., 1987). p. II.XII.2.  Hume wrote 
regarding the authority of the sovereign: “nor has the greatest and most lawful prince 
any more reason, upon that account, to plead a peculiar sacredness or inviolable 
authority, than an inferior magistrate, or even an usurper, or even a robber and a 
pyrate. The same divine superintendant, who, for wise purposes, invested a Titus or a 
Trajan with authority, did also, for purposes, no doubt, equally wise, though unknown, 
bestow power on a Borgia or an Angria.”  
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old official Company line of the Angrias as pirates above all else;7 the 
trend continued into the last century with British Colonel John Biddulph’s 
book, The Pirates of Malabar, and an Englishwoman in India, published in 
1907. The 1920s saw pirate historian Philip Gosse’s grossly inaccurate 
description of Angria as the “Brother of a famous pirate, Angora, Sultan of 
Timor”8 though in a subsequent monograph he corrected his major 
mistakes using the accounts of 18th century British chroniclers.9 The 
most significant change in the historiography of the Angrias during the 
1900s came out of India after independence riding on the waves of 
nationalist revisionism. Under this new history the Angria dynasty was 
seen as an initial resister to European nascent colonialism.10 As a result, 
Kanhoji Angria took on the status of the father of the Indian navy due to 
his role as admiral (Sarkhel) of the Maratha fleet. During this period 
Kanhoji Angria was even honoured by having a naval base named after 
him in 1951.11 Ascribing the characteristics of freedom fighters to the 
Angrias was plausible in this light because Maratha nationalism itself 
experienced resurgence since it was a focal point of colonial resistance at 
the turn of the century. Under the rhetoric of the politics of partition, the 
Marathas became the first indigenous Hindu empire in India and one that 
created itself at the expense of the Muslim Mughals.   
 Since then, scholarship on Mughal and colonial India has brought 
balance back to historical interpretations of the Marathas, but not so of 
the Angrias. With the Angrias, the nationalist rendering has since been 
                                                          
7 For examples see, Duff, History of the Mahrattas, Vol. 1. 1826; Low, History of the 
Indian Navy (1613-1863), 1877; and Orme, Military Transactions of the British Nation in 
Indostan, 1861. 
8 Philip Gosse, "A Pirate's Who's Who Giving Particulars of the Lives and Deaths of 
Pirates and Buccaneers,"  (New York: Burt Franklin, 1924). p. 13. 
9 Philip Gosse, The History of Piracy (New York: Dover, 1932; reprint, Dover 2007). pp. 
244-252. 
10 For example see, Manohar Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey, Maratha Admiral: An 
Account of His Life and His Battles with the English (London: Asia Publishing House, 
1959).  
11 Dilnaz Boga, "I.N.S. Angre to Celebrate Golden Jubilee," in The Times of India 
(Mumbai: India Times, 4 September 2001). 
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largely dismissed outright yet not replaced, whereas the Marathan history 
was corrected and subsequently built upon. Considering the Angrias went 
from being a sub-section of Indian history to, more currently, rarely more 
than a footnote, this is hardly surprising. The outcome therefore, has 
been a revival in the acceptance of nineteenth and turn of the century 
British interpretations of who and what the Angrias were -- namely 
pirates, without a critical engagement of the archival or compiled primary 
material. Recent scholarship, using the established ‘Angrias as pirates 
paradigm,’ has continued to obfuscate the nature of the Angria dynasty 
and how it interacted with European and south Asian polities.  Even the 
work of historian Laskhmi Subramanian, which does engage critically with 
the material and sheds new light on both the history of Bombay and 
Indian Ocean piracy, still continues to categorise all the Angrias as mere 
pirates and reactionaries against British incursion.12 What occurred in the 
past and was carried forward into current scholarship has been a mis-
contextualisation of the Angrias by removing their story from its 
geopolitical environment. This study’s reappraisal of the material 
concerning the Angrias offers a significant step in the right direction to a 
more complex understanding of the historical realities of the Konkan 
littoral in early modern times.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
 Due to linguistic shortcomings, sources for this paper do draw 
heavily on European, specifically British, archive materials. Whenever 
possible, this study has incorporated the secondary material of 
researchers who have had access to the Marathi and other Indian 
languages primary sources. Nevertheless, Indian Ocean scholar Ashin 
                                                          
12 Lakshmi Subramanian, "Of Pirates and Potentates: Maritime Jurisdiction and the 
Construction of Piracy in the Indian Ocean," in Cultures of Trade: Indian Ocean 
Exchanges, ed. Devleena Ghosh and Stephen Muecke (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2007). pp. 26-28. 
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Das Gupta’s recommendations to researchers attempting to reconstruct 
South Asian history from European sources have been adopted. Data 
from European primary materials are used with the recognition that they 
may reflect Eurocentrism in the author’s or compiler’s ideas and that often 
they only deal with India when it is necessary as part of a wider European 
story. Careful attention has also been placed on avoiding “structured 
formulations” of political frameworks that create an iron skeleton of a 
narrative yet lack the nuance and detail of ground level social and 
economic history.13 Therefore, material from a variety of sources, such as 
private letters of company officials and naval officers, translations of 
Angria’s letters in company records, ships’ logs, and the accounts of 
contemporary chroniclers, are incorporated. Despite the paper’s focus on 
geopolitical interaction, decisions of this kind and the actions of states are 
always undertaken and influenced by the individuals who act in the story.  
 
 
2. The Angrias and the Wider Political Context 
 Central to this study is how the Angrias were situated within the 
wider geopolitical context of the Konkan coast. On one hand, they were 
authorities under the suzerainty of the Maratha emperor. On the other, 
they exercised a considerable degree of autonomy, entering into treaties 
and conflict with other polities along the coast such as the Siddis and 
European powers. Indeed, the history of the Angrias cannot be separated 
from the Marathas; they are intertwined, both having influenced the 
outcome of the other. As the Maratha ruler made the Angrias, so too did 
they later play a significant role in their destruction. Accounts of the 
Angrias, though plentiful, are either incomplete or inaccurate taking much 
imaginary licence. None insert the Angrias into their political context 
                                                          
13 Das Gupta, A. 'Some Problems of Reconstructing the History of India's West Coast 
from European Sources', in, Merchants of Maritime India, 1500-1800, (Aldershot, 
1994), p. 175. 
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which was crucial to their territorial development and military actions 
throughout the long half-century they ruled the Konkan. To reconcile this 
problem and the recognised obscurity of the case in general, it is 
necessary to relate here the historical narrative. The story below will 
focus mainly on the rise of the Angrian dynasty through Kanhoji, as it was 
with he that had the longest career and established the policies of how 
the Maratha’s maritime political sovereignty would be articulated. 
 
2.1 The Rise of Kanhoji 
 According to Maratha chronicles, in 1688 Kanhoji received from 
Emperor Sambhaji the command of Survarnadurg fortress.14 Ten years 
later the new Maratha emperor, Rajaram bestowed upon Angria the 
command (Subedar) of the northern section of the Maratha fleet, based 
out of Gheriah and Surnarndurg. Though in charge of the navy and 
influential, it would appear that Angria was not at this time the only 
authority of the Maratha Konkan. The first reference of Kanhoji in the 
English records is a response to an incident which occurred in January 
1698/99 when “the Sevajees of Podundroog Castle neare Danda Rapore 
seized upon two salt vesselles belonging to this Island [Bombay]” and 
that the crew was “imprisoned and most miserably beate.”15 As a result, 
Bombay authorities retaliated by placing under arrest the Padmadurg 
emissaries sent to collect ransoms for the imprisoned crew as well as 
ceasing all salt trade to the Marathas.  In early February a report from 
Bombay castle stated that the “Subedar of Conagy Angra…would get the 
2 men that were imprisoned by Padamdrooke releast, and that for the 
future none of our inhabitants should be abused, we permitted the salt 
vessell to goe.”16 Angria displayed diplomatic foresight in appeasing the 
                                                          
14 Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey, Maratha Admiral. pp. 54-55; Sen, Early Career of 
Kanhoji Angria. p. 2. 
15 Sen, Early Career of Kanhoji Angria. p. 5. 
16 Ibid. p. 6. 
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British. Malgonkar states that Bombay at this time was the centre of the 
region’s salt production, which was not worth losing trade rights over.17 
This was the only incident over which the cessation of the Bombay salt 
trade was threatened.     
 During this period the Maratha Confederacy was waging a war for 
its survival in the interior against Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb’s troops. 
Rajaram was besieged in the distant fortress of Gingee and barely 
escaped with his life. Meanwhile in the Konkan, Angria was establishing 
Marathan sovereignty by issuing a pass, called a dastak, to maritime 
merchants who operated in Konkan ports and waters. Such papers were 
similar to the cartaz “according to the ancient Form established by the 
Portuguese”18 in the early 1500s and were now a staple method of 
political articulation used by British and Dutch alike.19 The Portuguese, 
however, were never able to completely enforce their monopoly on spices 
and often came to accommodation with local powers especially if they 
could not use the threat of coercion or their trade depended upon the 
power.20 By the turn of the 18th century, “prudent traders had already 
begun to equip themselves with both the cartaz and dastaks” in order to 
protect themselves.21 The EIC did not agree with any institution that cut 
into its profits. The Company was no longer challenged significantly by 
the other European powers and had had more-or-less free reign of the 
Malabar and Konkan coasts for the past hundred years. An employee of 
the Dutch East India Company commented on the effects the cartaz had 
on certain aspects of their business when he wrote “…it does not appear 
                                                          
17 Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey, Maratha Admiral. p. 70. 
18 Clement Downing, A Compendious History of the Indian Wars with an Account of the 
Rise, Progress, Strength, and Forces of Angria the Pyrate (London: T. Cooper, 1737). 
p. 31. 
19 Holden Furber, "Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient 1600-1800," in Maritime India 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). p. 268. 
20 K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History 
from the Rise of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). pp. 74-75. 
21 Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey, Maratha Admiral. p. 95. 
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probable that this trade alone [Surat to Masquette, a port in Arabia] or the 
transport of the Company’s commodities would make good the 
expenditure they have to incur, since passes have to be obtained from 
the Angrias…the English and the Portuguese, in coming and going.”22 
Conflict seemed inevitable but Kanhoji had given Bombay the assurance 
that it would not molest its inhabitants after the incident over the salt 
vessels.    
 The cartaz was always a fluid construct. In theory the vessels of all 
nations had to possess them if they were to trade unmolested. The 
issuing authority would stop a trading ship at sea and if the captain failed 
to produce a valid pass the vessel and goods could be seized and the 
crew held at ransom. Chronicler and employee of the EIC, Clement 
Downing related being stopped by Angria’s vessels in September 1716, 
during a moment of concord between Angria and the Company. He 
remembered,  
 
Then they ask’d where we belong’d to, or whether we had a Pass 
from the Governor of Bombay; I told them yes, tho’ I did not at that 
time rightly know so much. They never offered to misuse us, nor do 
us any manner of Harm; only detained us four or five Hours [while 
the lead EIC ship in the convoy arrived at the scene]…They 
releas’d us soon after the Captain came off with the Pass.23 
 
As the Europeans inserted themselves into the Indian Ocean world so too 
did the local powers adopt foreign structures when and where it suited 
them. It is not surprising that local polities should have adopted the 
revenue producing system, made commonplace by Europeans. 
  Though exempted from the dastak by Angria, the EIC was 
concerned that a local land power was exercising sovereignty and 
developing their capabilities on the seas, which for the previous two 
                                                          
22 Ashin Das Gupta, "Malabar in Asian Trade 1740-1800," in India and the Indian 
Ocean World: Trade and Politics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). p. 92. 
23 Downing, A History of the Indian Wars. pp. 21-22. 
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hundred years had been the uncontested domain of European authority. 
Yet, despite European superior firepower and deep sea vessel 
technology the Company’s forces were not numerically superior or 
organised effectively enough to counter strong Indian polities: the military 
balance had not yet tipped in Europe’s favour.24 Indeed, as this narrative 
will demonstrate, Europeans would not possess the military capability to 
destroy Indian regional powers until around the middle of the century.  
 Bombay could not contest the Maratha’s claims of coastal 
sovereignty with force because it was practically defenceless. Despite 
being surrounded by potentially hostile neighbours, until Governor 
Charles Boone arrived at Bombay in December 1715 the city “was 
unwalled, and no Grabs or Frigates to protect any thing but the Fishery; 
except a small Munchew.”25 Within a year Boone had a wall built and the 
beginnings of the Bombay Marine constructed. Twenty-five vessels of 
different sizes were built by 1716, carrying from five to thirty-two guns 
each, to the cost of £51,700.26 In the absence of the Company’s overall 
military superiority, the period 1698 to 1715 was one in which Bombay 
was forced to negotiate. Economic historian Kirti Chaudhuri reports that it 
was only with reluctance that the EIC Court sanctioned any naval actions 
against Angria “saying they had no desire to make war on an enemy from 
whom nothing worth while was to be expected by way of financial gain.”27 
Indeed it was Company policy to negotiate settlements in this period 
having recently lost a war with the Mughals that saw Bombay occupied by 
the Siddis in 1690. The English were well aware of what the 
consequences could be if they took on another land empire in India. 
                                                          
24 Geoffrey Parker, "Europe and the Wider World, 1500-1750: The Military Balance," in 
The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, ed. James Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). p. 162.  
25 Downing, A History of the Indian Wars. p. 10. 
26 Charles R. Low, History of the Indian Navy (1613-1863), 2 vols., vol. I (London: 
Richard Bently & Son, 1877). p. 96. 
27 K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 
1660-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). p. 118. 
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Truces were thus called and negotiations drawn up between Bombay and 
Gheria. 
 In 1700/01, the Siddis who were the principle Mughal maritime 
force attacked Angria besieging him at his headquarters in the fortress of 
Kolaba and also at Khanderi. The Siddis were unsuccessful and falsely 
blamed their loss on Bombay for supplying the “Sevajees” with 
ammunition.28 Once able, Angria began enforcing Marathan claims on the 
seas mainly with indigenous traders. Malgonkar contends that it was first 
the British who in 1702 broke their truce by seizing a ship carrying 
Angria’s dastak, though this was probably due to a difference of opinion 
between Angria and the Company.29 We know from Bombay and Surat 
reports that Angria’s vessels were patrolling the coast and stopping 
fishing boats and local traders. To Kanhoji these fell within his rights and 
jurisdiction outlined by the agreement while the Company opined that any 
vessel belonging to anyone resident in their territory or carrying English 
goods was considered an English vessel and therefore protected under 
the treaty. As we will see later, this was a common position for the EIC in 
its negotiations. Company documents record the truce breaking in a 
different perspective and give the incident as occurring in 1703. They 
remark the “Sevajees…are grown very insolent” and that a ship belonging 
to one of Kanhoji’s cities came into Bombay harbour where “twas agreed 
and resolved to embargo and detain here said vessell, cargo and 
people.”30 The following year, Angria retaliated by bringing seven of his 
gallivats, a type of low-lying vessel of around 120 tons with double masts, 
to blockade Bombay harbour. The Company was compelled to entreat in 
                                                          
28 Sen, Early Career of Kanhoji Angria. p. 6. The term “Sevajees” was used as a 
synonym for the Marathas and persisted with the British for more than a century after 
Shivaji, founder of the Maratha Confederacy, died in 1680. 
29 Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey, Maratha Admiral. p. 107. 
30 Sen, Early Career of Kanhoji Angria. p. 7. 
 12
order not to be starved out. Bombay records state that Angria was told, 
though in an unthreatening manner, that  
 
…he cant be permitted searching, molesting or seizing any boates, 
groabs or other vessells, from what port, harbour, place of what 
nation soever they may be, bringing provisions, timber or 
merchandize to Bombay…without breach of that friendship the 
English nation has always had with Raja Sevajee and all his 
Captains in subordination to him.31  
 
Angria’s response was that they, “the Savajees,” had been at war with the 
Mughals for the past 40 years and they would continue to “seize what 
boates or other vessell belonging either to the Mogulls vessells from any 
of his forts or Mallabarr, excepting such as had Conjee Angras passports; 
the English being at liberty acting as they please.”32 Several themes are 
vividly illustrated here: Kanhoji asserted not only his role as a Subedar of 
the Maratha Confederacy, but also the authority of the Marathan state. 
Moreover, that he has an obligation to act against the Mughals with whom 
his state is at war. Simultaneously, he rejected English claims of regional 
authority and made clear that the Company was operating in India near 
Marathan territory, not the other way around.    
 For the next eight years Kanhoji made good on his word by seizing 
country and European vessels alike.  Unfortunately, in absence of 
indigenous shipping records, it is impossible to know how many country 
vessels carried Kanhoji’s dastak and how many were seized. The 
European records, though fragmented, indicate that losses were 
significant as this letter to the EIC in Bombay in March 1706/07 indicates,  
 
Your Honours will I presume, from Bombay have a particular 
account of the growth of the Sevajee Canajee Angra, there ill and 
                                                          
31 IOR/P/341/2, "Bombay Public Proceedings," in IOR (London: British Library, 1704-
1707). p. 15. 
32 Ibid. p. 90. 
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near neighbour. He hath lattely taken a ship belonging to Mr. 
Mildmay and your Honours broker at Carwarr, a ship of Mr. 
Bouchers of about 200 tons, per cargo amounting to 70,000 
rupees, the Diamond of Madras carrying 12 guns and twenty-six 
Europeans, her cargo worth near two lakh33 of rupees, one of the 
Islands manchuas, another ship of about two hundred tons, to 
whose belonging I don’t yet hear, and a Dutch Hoigh man’d with 
about 26 Dutchmen, besides sundry other small vessels.34 
 
With a land invasion out of the question, initially the English response 
was to try to use force to halt Angria’s extension of Marathan sovereignty 
over the coast. However, in an age-old problem of Europeans trying to 
suppress maritime depredations, the EIC found that their heavy, deep-
drawing ships could not pursue Kanhoji’s smaller lighter ghurabs (grabs) 
and gallivats into the coastal shoals and estuaries allowing them to 
escape.35 Indeed there are no records of any of Angria’s vessels being 
captured at sea until 1736. As Malgonkar has observed, what allowed 
Kanhoji to be so aggressive at asserting his jurisdiction at sea was that 
there was no effective way that any other regional polity could retaliate 
because “the Marathas did not depend upon sea trade.”36 Without 
shipping of their own to defend, Angria could remain solely on the 
offensive, a fact noted and somewhat lamented by Bombay Governor 
Phipps in a letter to Kanhoji in May 1724, 
 
Had your Honor in the beginning of your rise in the 
world…cultivated in your territories, a correspondence…and 
employed that power Providence has by degree blessed you with, 
to protect trade, instead of quite the contrary practice you have 
made use of, the territories your Honor now governs might by this 
                                                          
33 A lakh is a unit in the South Asian numbering system equal to one hundred 
thousand. 
34 Sen, Early Career of Kanhoji Angria. p. 9. 
35 Indeed this was a common problem experienced universally when trying to establish 
jurisdiction or bring to justice known pirate haunts. The British struggled with it for years 
and never did actually solve the problem.  For a good description and history of the 
problem see the Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (London: Methuen, 2004). 
36 Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey, Maratha Admiral. p. 130. 
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time have been equal in some measures to vie with the Great port 
of Surat, your Honors Power esteemed to be raised on justice, and 
yourself become revered for your virtues, whereas now your Honor 
is more terrible to your friends than enemies.37 
 
In this letter one can also read that the British considered Kanhoji as a 
government in his own right. Indeed, by as early as 1704 Biddulph claims 
that Kanhoji was being described as a “Rebel Independent of the Rajah 
Sivajee.”38 Placing the date of the supposed Angria/Maratha rupture even 
earlier, Lakshmi Subramanian contends that Kanhoji took “advantage of 
the confusion that followed the execution of Sambhaji in 1689” to succeed 
in “gaining hegemony over the Konkan’s trade and shipping.”39 However, 
as already shown, it was Rajaram, Sambhaji’s successor who bestowed 
the title of Subedar on Kanhoji. Confusion over Kanhoji’s ties to the 
Marathas may stem from the political upheavals the Maratha 
Confederacy underwent during the late 1600s and early 1700s, which are 
described below.   
 
2.2 The Maratha Civil War 
 The Marathan state was a hereditary monarchy descended from 
Shivaji, the first Marathan emperor, who died in 1680. For nine years his 
son Sambhaji ruled before being captured and executed by Aurangzeb, 
the Mughal emperor. In 1700, Rajaram, another of Shivaji’s sons who had 
also succeeded to the throne died leaving three sons. The eldest, Shahu, 
was captured by the Mughal army and held by Aurangzeb for eighteen 
years during the Maratha Mughal wars. The next oldest son, Sambhaji II 
was the infant of Rajaram’s oldest wife, Tarabai who had gathered 
enough political support to become Queen Regent, governing in her son’s 
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name. During this time, Angria carried on his mandate as Subedar of the 
northern fleet. The Konkan, due to its geographical location on the other 
side of the mountain barrier known as the Western Ghats, was practically 
the only region of the Maratha Confederacy not being depredated by 
Mughal troops or the effects of war. Maratha historian Stewart Gordon 
states that according to the Mughal histories “throughout the 1690s there 
was little functioning Maratha polity in Maharashtra. The state Shivaji had 
created had ceased to exist.”40 Though the interior was troubled the 
Konkan was relatively peaceful. Given the problems of early 18th century 
communications, aggravated by a country in the throes of conflict, Angria 
was the de facto ruler of his part of the Konkan. Yet despite this, in all the 
records surveyed, at no time does Kanhoji refer to himself as anything 
other than a servant of the Maratha state. Indeed in a response to 
Bombay during a round of treaty negotiations in 1706 Kanhoji stated that 
he could accept the agreement “provided the terms of friendship are 
agreed upon with the Rana [Tarabai].”41 Nevertheless, the idea persists 
that Kanhoji was operating as his own sovereign. It is easy to see why 
considering the subsequent Maratha political developments. 
 Confusion was exacerbated regarding where Kanhoji’s loyalties lay 
following Aurangzeb’s death in 1707 because Shahu was able to make 
his escape during the prevailing anarchy that resulted from the Mughal 
accession struggle. As a result, the Marathas underwent their own 
succession struggle as Shahu in his freedom claimed the throne. Factions 
developed among the Maratha deshmuhks, or influential land-holding 
families, which were split in their support. One group supported the 
reigning Queen Regent Tarabai and the other half for Shahu, the rightful 
heir to the throne. Shahu’s legitimacy was held in question due to 
rumours that he was an impostor and by concerns that because the 
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Mughals for had held him so long that his loyalty could not be counted 
upon.42 The make-up of the Marathas and noble families warrants further 
explanation.  
 The structure of the Maratha polity was that it was an 
amalgamation of deshmukhs who supplied troops to, and collected taxes 
for, the centre similar in composition to the Mughal administrative 
structure of the zamindari system.43 Gordon goes so far as to claim that 
“[t]he history of...the Maratha polity is, thus, the history of these 
deshmukh families.”44 This situation was typical of most early modern 
states and fits well within Koenigsberger’s definition of a composite state 
that is a polity “including more than one country under the sovereignty of 
one ruler.”45 Under such a design the emperor can only rule through the 
acquiescence of those countries under their domain. In the early modern 
period, heteronomous political environments were indeed the norm and 
the supreme sovereign, in the Maratha case the Emperor, did not have a 
monopoly on the state’s use or control of violence.46 The incapacity of the 
state to control such was mainly a result of the fact that early modern 
administrative and bureaucratic structures were not developed enough to 
allow for direct control over vast swathes of territory. Alliances through 
patronage networks were established so that one could govern under the 
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name of a higher authority. The Weberian conception of the state as “the 
exceptionally penetrative sovereign, territorial state” did not yet exist 
either in continental Europe or India.47 Thus, Angria, like most local lords 
or rulers, was able to exercise a certain degree of autonomy despite 
being unquestionably aligned and subservient to the state.   
 In developing Koenigsberger’s idea, J. H. Elliott makes the point 
“[c]omposite monarchies based on loose dynastic union…could only hope 
to survive if systems of patronage were maintained in careful working 
order.”48 Such systems in the Confederacy were thrown into disarray 
during the civil war resulting from the power struggle between Tarabai 
and Shahu, which lasted until 1713. Kanhoji as the deshmukh and 
authority over the country of the Konkan was still under the sovereignty of 
the Maratha emperor, but which one? Initially Angria was a prominent 
member of the Tarabai faction. This situation allowed for a large degree 
of subjectivity in determining whether Kanhoji did indeed break away from 
the Marathas. If the British chose to view Shahu as the legitimate ruler 
then Kanhoji’s support for Tarabai could easily be seen as rejecting 
Maratha authority. It may also be due to this period why Downing states 
that Kanhoji “declared open War with all Nations.”49 Yet at the same time 
it is difficult to see how he could amount to being the “Founder of a new 
Kingdom in India”50 as one anonymous EIC employee in Bombay claimed 
Kanhoji was, simply because the latter still aligned himself under the 
sovereignty of one of the contenders for Maratha leadership. 
 Initially Tarabai commanded the support of most of the deshmukh 
families.  Within a year only about half remained on her side after she lost 
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a series of early battles and had to seek refuge in the Konkan with 
Angria. Soon thereafter however, Tarabai was able to retake the forts and 
territory lost to Shahu. Gordon describes this period as one in which land 
and alliances switched sides frequently and Maratha regional leaders 
“more and more took wholly independent action.”51 There was little co-
ordination between groups within the factions and some leaders took it 
upon themselves to make raids into favourite places in Mughal territory 
like the rich entrepôt of Surat, the effect of which was to mark the 
beginning of that city’s decline.52 Angria never changed allegiances in this 
early part of the war – he had no need to. Under Tarabai he was given 
the title of Surkhail or Grand Admiral in hereditary perpetuity in 1707 
greatly increasing his personal and family’s influence.53  
 During the time that the civil war dragged on Kanhoji continued to 
patrol the Konkan littoral though it is clear from the records that 
encounters with European vessels diminished from 1707 to 1712. A minor 
resumption of actions against Europeans occurred in 1710, with the 
seizure of a Dutch sloop and galley54 and later, a failed attempt on an EIC 
ship, the Godolphin, just outside of Bombay harbour.55 Most famously in 
1712 Kanhoji’s fleet engaged an EIC yacht, the Anne, accompanied by a 
man-of-war. The Anne was carrying the president of the factory at 
Carwar, Robert Chown and his new wife who were on their way to 
Bombay. During the engagement Chown “had his Right Arm shot off, and 
bled to Death in the young lady’s Arms.”56 The “young lady” was later 
ransomed for 30,000 rupees.57  
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 There are three explanations for fluctuations between hostilities 
and peace throughout the years 1707 until the treaties of 1713. One 
possible reason could be that the initial shocks of the civil war were the 
worst and resources had to be reallocated away from the coast to the 
Western Ghats in order to defend against the potential threat from 
Shahu’s inland armies. Once these positions were secure attention could 
be returned to the coast. Actions against companies’ shipping could have 
created conflict among the Europeans and Angria, thus opening a second 
front, this one from the sea. Without the resources to defend both ghats 
and coast pragmatism may have won out. As the civil war progressed and 
stabilised, and the Konkan’s security from outside incursion was 
established, Kanhoji could afford to resume actions against those 
Europeans shipping in his waters who failed to purchase his dastak. A 
second factor, which can be found in the existing tales from the British 
chroniclers, but has yet to be corroborated by Portuguese archival 
evidence, is that from 1707-1710 Kanhoji was making attacks against 
Portuguese fortresses and factories in order to consolidate his control 
over the Konkan.58 Other reports state that this culminated in a failed 
reprisal attack against the fortress of Kolaba by the Portuguese who 
brought the Siddis into alliance with them. As a result Angria made a 
move as soon as possible against the Siddis following the cessation of 
the civil war.59 Thirdly then, Angria was biding his time reinforcing not 
only the ghats but also his coastal forts preparing for the next 
engagement with the Moghul backed Siddis. During the succession ci
wars that plagued both the Marathas and the Mughals neither side had 
ceased its hostilities towards one another, though there was an unoff
truce between the Siddis and Kanhoji. As previously mentioned, raids 
vil 
icial 
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were made against Surat and the Mughals sought to win over deshmukh
to their empire. Certainly conflict with each other took secondary status t
internal matters. The Siddis and Angria had been at odds before and their 
proximity to each other nearly guaranteed that as long as their empires 
were at war, so too would they. It seems likely that Angria spent this time 
preparing for what seemed like inevitable conflict on all possible fronts. 
s 
o 
                                                          
 Shahu decided to send an army into the Konkan in 1712. The next 
year, a force was dispatched but was defeated and its general taken 
prisoner by Angria. Rumours spread that Kanhoji was going to march 
over the ghats against Shahu’s capital Satara. Shahu hurriedly 
assembled a smaller force under newly appointed Peshwa (prime 
minister) Balaji Vishwanath to defend the mountain passes but they were 
hopelessly outnumbered.60 Balaji instead went to Kanhoji to negotiate. 
There are several interpretations as to the outcome. One is that Kanhoji 
was bribed,61 another that he felt he had to recognise the real and legal 
descendent of the House of Shivaji,62 and finally that he negotiated 
rationally and secured the best terms he could.63 Nevertheless, the result 
was the same. In exchange for Angria’s pledge of support for Shahu, the 
former was to receive confirmation of the title of surkhail and ten 
fortresses along the Konkan as well as sixteen fortified palaces and their 
dependent villages.64 In addition, the Marathi chronicles record he also 
received an annual income of thirty-six lakhs of rupees.65 The latter being 
important for revenue as Kanhoji was responsible for the collection of 
taxes within his jurisdiction and remitting a percentage of that income to 
the Maratha ruler. The accommodation negotiated by Balaji between 
60 Duff, A History of the Mahrattas. pp. 434-436. 
61 Low, History of the Indian Navy (1613-1863). p. 97. 
62 Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey, Maratha Admiral. pp. 144-145. 
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Shahu and Kanhoji deprived Tarabai of her most important supporter.66 
Soon after she and her son were arrested though she was later released 
after her son died in captivity, therefore, depriving her of any legitimate 
claims to the throne. As a result, the civil conflict that had torn apart 
Maharashtra came to an end.  
 In 1714 the Peshwa and Angria marched against the Siddis and 
reduced their territory significantly while forcing them to accept 
unfavourable terms of peace. This treaty would hold for the next two 
decades until the Siddis entered into a conflict against the Marathas on 
the side of the Portuguese. As a result Balaji would return with troops in 
1733 to destroy the Siddis as a geopolitical power.67 By 1715, the 
Marathas had become the dominant indigenous power on the Konkan 
littoral with Kanhoji Angria as their representative authority.   
 Impossible to know for certain, but nonetheless very likely, Angria’s 
naval patrols had continued against country traders throughout the 
Maratha civil war as it was an important source of revenue. However, due 
to a lack of written records only speculative guesses can be made. 
Depredations against north European company ships were not recorded 
for the year the Maratha civil war came to a close in 1713. In fact, the 
next three years saw no further maritime action take place against 
European company shipping as a result of a treaty between the EIC and 
Angria and the apparent payment of tribute to Angria from the Dutch.68 In 
1716 the situation unravelled and the Konkan littoral would not see the 
same level of peace until 1756. 
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3. Changing Relationships 
 The end of the civil war saw a gradual resumption of hostile 
activities between Angria and the north European companies. Kanhoji 
continued to take country vessels that did not carry his cartaz while the 
Company felt that he had no right to do so.  With Governor Boone at the 
helm, the EIC continued to build up their naval forces, which by 1717 
numbered nineteen vessels.69 In that same year the first of several 
unsuccessful attacks against Angria’s fleet and fortresses commenced 
during Boone’s tenure.  
 There were three economic and one political reason the EIC 
wanted to check the power of the Marathas. From the Company’s 
perspective, Bombay was a “deficit government which could barely 
support itself” and as such it could not fight wars of territorial conquest.70 
More revenue was needed. Bombay was a small port and even in the 
lucrative trading environment of Surat, the average value of EIC trade for 
example had only grown to 322,280 rupees by 1740-1745, compared to 
the Asian merchants’ 2,000,000.71 Though initially it was thought that 
action against Angria would not be cost effective, it was later realised that 
this might not be so. One method of gaining additional revenue was to 
control the trade routes as the Portuguese had tried and thereafter raise 
cartaz fees to monopolistic prices. Additionally, if it was the sole maritime 
power, the Company could “impose a general tonnage duty on all Surat 
ships.”72 However, these plans would involve subduing Angria. Second, 
the Marathas on sea and land were a cause of instability. They had been 
at the gates of Surat on more than one occasion in the early 18th century 
and raids into the surrounding Gujarati hinterland had caused weaver and 
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suppliers to relocate to other more secure markets. Furthermore, the tolls 
charged at sea and on land routes were high which cut into traders’ 
bottom lines.73 Insecurity on land raised transaction costs and disrupted 
the economy. Meanwhile competition between polities over sovereignty, 
expressed politically through the cartaz, also raised transaction costs 
because merchants had to purchase several passes if they were to trade 
unmolested.  
 Third, there were personal considerations. Company employees 
were paid meagre wages that they made up for through the private trade 
they were allowed to carry out in the Company’s vessels.74 All levels of 
employees were active in this kind of trade. For many, especially those in 
the highest positions, this was how fortunes were made.75 Considering 
that Angria’s actions could result in the loss of not only Company, but also 
of personal trade goods, personnel in all levels of the Company would 
have wanted to make the coast secure from paying additional duties or 
from the risk of ship’s seizure, especially if as a result it led to regional 
maritime hegemony where everyone could possibly partake in the 
benefits.    
 Politically the English were unwilling to accept the sovereignty of 
another state over the coastal seas. The Company had been in the region 
since the establishment of their factory at Surat in 1612. The Company 
had since effectively squeezed out other European powers, such as the 
Portuguese, and grown to become the recognised maritime power by the 
Mughals and other lesser potentates in the region. For example, after a 
series of depredations by European pirates that included British pirates 
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Henry Every seizing the richly laden Ganj-I Sawai in 1695, the largest 
ship of the Surat merchant fleet and three years later William Kidd 
capturing the Quedah Merchant, a high Mughal court official’s ship, a 
diplomatic debacle ensued that had been brewing for years between the 
Mughals and the EIC. The end result of which was the agreement that the 
Company would undertake responsibility for the operation of a convoy in 
order to ensure the safe passage of Mughal shipping in and out of Surat 
and the Konkan coastline against the attacks of European pirates.  
Historian Laura Benton argues that by accepting the agreement the 
EIC recognised implicitly Mughal regional dominance on terra firma while 
conversely the Mughals, by utilising the Company for maritime security 
reciprocally legitimised the Company’s sovereignty on the high seas.76 
However, the EIC was not the only polity to be held responsible for the 
native merchants’ losses, so too was the Dutch East India Company who 
also operated a factory in Surat.77 Rather than the Mughals bowing to 
European naval and military superiority Das Gupta contends that the 
Mughals considered the Europeans to be of little consequential threat.78 
Only five years previously they had trounced the English in a war and 
perceived no long-term disadvantages in coercing the Europeans to 
accept trading privileges on Mughal terms. Furthermore, by 
opportunistically making the European companies absorb the bulk of the 
price for protecting native ships and trade wares the authorities in Surat 
externalised partly the transaction costs of their powerful merchant 
backers. The Mughals would find that they had overplayed their hand. 
The EIC was able to flex its naval might through a blockade of Surat that 
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enabled them to gain better terms and placed them in an advantageous 
position vis-à-vis the Dutch.  
By 1715 it was clear that Surat was in decline. The English were 
able to take solace in their factory to the south in Bombay. It was here 
that they concentrated their resources in the Konkan. The Company had 
struggled with the Mughals and powerful merchants of Surat as well as 
with the competing European powers. They were not about to share their 
recent gains with a new indigenous rising power. 
 
3.1 Governor Boone Declares War 
The failure of the Marathas to recognise the Company as sovereign 
over the seas coupled with the rise of the Maratha navy under Angria 
meant for Governor Boone that there was no other choice but to use 
force to suppress Angria. After Bombay’s fleet and defences were 
established, Boone began a series of unsuccessful attacks against 
Angria’s forts.  
 The first target was Vingorola Fortress on the island of Kenerey 
situated at the mouth of Bombay harbour. This had been under Angria’s 
jurisdiction for the past four years when Shahu transferred over its 
administration to him.79 Two frigates, the Fame and the Britannia were 
sent with a company of sepoys to attack from land and sea.  They were 
soon after joined by another frigate, the Revenge and a dozen or so 
gallivats to land the troops.  Biddulph claims the force returned after 
unsuccessfully bombarding the fort and being unable to even land the 
troops for the main assault. The commodore in charge of the operation 
was blamed for the failure, accused of being a coward, and dismissed 
from service.80 Later the same year another force was assembled of over 
twenty vessels and 2500 European soldiers and 1500 sepoys and 
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topasses. The target to attack was Kanhoji’s headquarters: the fortress of 
Geriah. This undertaking also proved a failure. The only result was to 
declare the castle impregnable at the cost of two hundred men killed and 
three hundred “dangerously wounded.”81  
 In early November 1718, the same fleet that had attacked Geriah 
was sent to Kenery to make another attempt on the fortress. The 
besiegers brought their broadsides to bear on the fortress and 
“cannanaded the Island very hott, lykewise the Island them.”82 The 
barrage was kept up from the third of November till the fifth when troops 
were landed but forced to hold back due to the “brisk Fire the Enemy 
made, and the cowardice of two of the Land Officers.”83 The sixth and 
seventh of the month also saw attempts at gaining access to the fortress 
but these too were repelled, though “more by the force of stones hove 
from the rocks than fier arms”84 causing “several of our Men killed, or 
rather massacred, when they made this sudden Retreat.”85 On November 
8, the attack was called off.   
 Governor Boone proved himself not one to give up. While 
negotiating a peace settlement with the Marathas and receiving 
compensation for goods and ships seized by Angria to the amount of 
22,000 rupees, the next year was spent in preparation for another all-out 
assault on Geriah.86 Boone was also trying to bring other polities into 
alliance with the Company against Angria such as the Persians, 
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prominent Surati Mughal merchants, and the Siddis.87 Fortunately for 
Angria these negotiations all came to naught. Boone also had a new type 
of ship designed and constructed for the attack called the Phram, “the 
great and mighty floating machine”88 which had a large strengthened 
deck and shallow draught and could thus be towed in close to fortress 
walls in order to cannonade them. A factory employee, Walter Brown, led 
the expedition commanding from the deck of the London whose Captain 
Upton left an account of the battle in the ship’s logbook.  
 According to Upton they sailed down to Geriah on the twenty-first of 
September 1720 and began the assault the following day. Brown having 
no military experience ordered troops ashore without first softening 
Geriah’s defences or making sure to secure his troops’ retreat. The result 
was six soldiers dead on the first day “besides about twenty wounded.”89 
Some of his own forces had yet to even arrive from Bombay, including the 
Phram. When the latter did arrive, the experimental vessel was put into 
action immediately and found to be defective in design. Its hull openings 
were cut at an incorrect angle causing the cannons to not even be able to 
“fling a balle Pistolle shot out of the water, the mussells of her guns 
pointing directly down.”90 For the next several days the Bombay force sat 
in the harbour out of range of Geriah’s guns beset by problems with the 
officers and men “drinking from morning to night and noe command 
carryed.”91 A landing force was again organised for the twenty-ninth 
ending in a fiasco when one of the Phram’s guns exploded, killing the five 
sepoys manning her. After several more days of “continnal disturbances 
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in the ship dayly by the Officers ixcessive drinking & noe manner of 
Command carryed,” the fleet finally weighed anchor to attack one of 
Angria’s forts, Tamana further south near Goa.92 This was at the request 
of a local potentate and Captain Upton opined that Brown used the 
appeal as an excuse to abandon the failure that had become their 
attempted assult on Geriah. Subsequently the allied potentate did not 
keep his end of the agreement by not even appearing with troops to 
assist in the taking of Tamana. As a result Brown ordered the fleet to 
return to Bombay. On the way back the Phram was purposely set alight 
and scuttled so as not to slow the ship towing her.  
 Walter Brown was the last non-military Company servant to lead a 
military expedition. In 1721 the Royal Navy was brought in under the 
command of Commodore Matthews who led the most ambitious attack 
yet: a joint operation with the Portuguese starting in November to take the 
island and fortress of Kolaba. The Lusitanians were to march overland 
from their own territory in Chaul with 2,500 land forces while the EIC were 
going to supply a similar land force and include five ships of the Bombay 
Marine, in addition to the ships of the Royal Navy. The assault was to 
begin by bombarding the fortress from the water and when most 
appropriate to land artillery on the shore. It would then be possible to 
send in ground forces to storm the castle. When victorious, the 
Portuguese were to receive Kolaba and the EIC Geriah.93 Both parties 
agreed to be full allies and not to enter into separate peace with the 
enemy if the operation did not go as planned. Commanding on the 
Portuguese side was the Viceroy of Goa himself, Don Antonio de Castro 
and the General of the North assumed second in command. Kanhoji, 
having learned of the planned attack, had earlier been able to secure the 
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assistance of 25,000 of Shahu’s troops, which were on their way from 
across the ghats.94  
 Almost from the start the campaign was beset by problems for the 
attackers. There was little co-ordination between Commodore Matthews 
and Viceroy de Castro. Clement Downing, who was present at the battle 
offers an interesting, if not one-sided, account of it and states the English, 
“came boldly up to the Castle-Walls…where they pitch’d their Scaling-
Ladders and gallantly ascended the Walls” meanwhile,  
 
The Angrians came down in a great Body, with several Elephants; 
which the General of the North perceiving, he broke the Order of 
his wing…[and] the whole Army fell into Confusion. So soon as the 
Enemy saw that the Portuguese were on the Retreat, and the 
whole Army was confused, they came down upon them, and made 
a terrible Slaughter amongst the English Soldiers and Seamen; 
great part of our Artillery was taken with most of the Ammunition95 
 
The “Angrians” Downing refers to in the passage are the Maratha forces 
sent by Shahu to assist Kanhoji. Due to the day’s debacle, “the 
Commodore come on shore in a violent Rage, flew at the General of the 
North and thrust his Cane in his Mouth, and treated the Viceroy not much 
better.”96 At this juncture, the Portuguese, saw a way to get out of their 
agreement with the British and decided to open negotiations with the 
Maratha commander sent by Shahu. Because the EIC labelled Angria a 
pirate they did not consider waging war on him to be waging war on the 
Marathas. The Portuguese who were open to conclude a separate peace 
with the other Maratha general conveniently exploited this distinction, 
however false. Of this Downing wrote, “the Angrians defeated us this 
                                                          
94 Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey, Maratha Admiral. pp. 250-251. Malgonkar does not cite 
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time, intirely by the Treachery of the Portuguese, who seem’d to design 
only to lead our People on, and then to leave them in the lurch.”97  
 The British force arrived back in Bombay in early January. 
Governor Boone had hoped to end his tenure on a victorious note. His 
replacement, William Phipps, had been waiting in Bombay for over 
several weeks in order for Boone to get word of a victory that never came. 
Phipps took over on January 9, 1722 and thus ended the failed military 
ventures of Governor Boone.   
 Kanhoji was a tactful leader. His strategy consisted of calculated 
manoeuvres that stacked the odds in his favour and of never being in a 
position of fighting too many battles at once. Despite the more formidable 
firepower of the Company’s vessels Angria was able to exploit his 
comparative advantage by using small, easily negotiable, quick-sailing 
craft and strong defensive fortresses. The Company’s forces were 
undisciplined and suffered for want of professional command. Even when 
command was capable the lack of coordination both within the English 
forces and with their allies helped to defeat the missions before they even 
began. As such they were no match for a ready trained and professional 
force such as Angria’s. Learning from Boone’s mistakes, Phipps would 
adopt a different strategy of accommodation and negotiation in a new era 
of relations between the Marathas and the Company. 
 
3.2 New Angrias, New Governors, New Peshwas 
 The treachery the EIC felt towards the Portuguese as a result of 
their making peace with Angria had strained Anglo-Lusitanian relations. 
The Viceroy of Goa was able to secure very favourable terms from 
Angria. As a part of their new alliance the Estado da India had even 
“Harbour’d Angrias Vessells when purssued [by the EIC]” and when the 
EIC was confronted at sea by Angria’s ships the Portuguese “would not 
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give the English any assistance.”98 Being attacked by a combined force 
had gained Angria an ally, even if it was only through a neutrality 
agreement.  With one less European power to contend with on the seas 
Angria’s power had expanded rather than contracted as a result of 
Boone’s wars.  
 Initially Phipps sought to continue Boone’s policy of military and 
naval action against Angria. Six ships were built especially for use against 
‘the pirate’ in 1722 though three almost immediately after being put into 
service “perished altogether.”99 The twilight of 1722 saw London instruct 
Bombay to desist 
 
…warlike preparations against Angria [they have] been too 
excessive to be longer supported by us especially when our people 
both at the Coast & in the Bay…have loudly complained…we shall 
be necessitated to lessen that charge & maintain no more than 
sufficient to defend ourselves from Insults between Surat Bombay 
and the neighbouring places perhaps as far as Carwar without 
sending them down the Malabar Coast as we did a year or two 
since to the securing the country trade at our cost…100 
 
Bombay had it from high authority to back off.  The cost of the 
unsuccessful expeditions was too much for the Company to bear. They 
were, after all, there to make profits not to conquer. If the costs of dealing 
with Angria were to be lessened by accommodating or minimising as best 
as possible interactions with the Marathan admiral then so be it. By 
deciding to scale back the extent of their patrols and voluntarily 
relinquishing the security of the country trade, the EIC was implicitly 
recognising the jurisdiction of Kanhoji outside of the immediate Bombay 
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area. Peace, however, did not reign. Angria continued to stop and seize 
all “Ships or Vessells he could meet with and overpower Unless they had 
taken his pass for which they paid him well.”101 Apart from minor 
skirmishes and the occasional taking of vessels the years leading up to 
1729 were relatively peaceful ones. Angria and Phipps exchanged 
several letters in attempts to come to an accord and occasionally Kanhoji 
returned goods taken or the two sides exchanged prisoners. A general 
peace agreement, however, could not be arrived at.   
 In October 7, 1729 Bombay received word that Kanhoji Angria died. 
He was immediately succeeded by his son Sukhoji whose own career 
was “so flush’d with Success that they Attack but everything they 
meet.”102 This included the Portuguese and Siddis, both of whom were 
ousted from the Konkan by the Maratha army with the assistance of 
Angria.103 Upon Sukhoji’s own death in 1733, the surkhail was passed to 
Sambhaji. In 1735, the Maratha Peshwa Baji Rao divided the Angrian 
territories and gave the northern Konkan to Manaji, Sambhaji’s half-
brother. .104 The Confederacy had undergone several changes over the 
years. Foremost of which was the rise in power of the Peshwa. Emperor 
Shahu was by all accounts content to allow the day-to-day running of 
affairs in the hands of his ministers. As a result the Peshwa’s power had 
grown substantially to the point where, by the death of Shahu in 1749, 
they were able to take complete control of the affairs of state, while the 
new emperor Ramaraja was reigning in name only.105 With the exception 
of Manaji, none of Kanhoji’s sons were supportive of this development. 
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The failure of the surkhail-holding Angrias to support the peshwa regime 
would eventually lead to their downfall and the end of Angrian power on 
the coast. In their place the EIC would become the maritime hegemony. 
 Manaji Angria did not get along with his brothers and they were 
frequently in conflict with each other. The Company used this division as 
an opportunity by remaining neutral or only taking sides with the lesser 
power, Manaji, as they had doubts that any alliance with Sambhaji “would 
long continue in peace.”106 Despite the Company’s efforts, Sambhaji 
captured the most lucrative prize in the history of the Angrias when he 
captured the Derby on December 26, 1735.107 The loss was so great that 
Company factor lamented they “shall not have Treasure sufficient to 
provide a loading of coffee at Moche.”108 The Derby’s capture led to 
another round of negotiations between Angria and the EIC despite the 
latter’s sending out ships to engage Sambhoji’s vessels, who also 
continued to patrol. As a result, ships would be seized and bring any 
progress in negotiations back to the beginning. Without a freezing of 
hostilities while entreatments were being discussed peace was never 
seriously given a chance.   
 Notwithstanding the problems between the Peshwa and Sambhaji 
the English stated the latter “always called himself to be a servant of the 
Sou Rajas.”109 However, in 1740 the Company reported that “the 
Morattas are so jealous of Sambajee’s power and so many Hostilitys 
have already past between them, that they are bent upon Reducing him 
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and will in all Propability attack him.”110 This outcome was still several 
years away. Not until after the death of Shahu in 1749 would relations 
between the Angrias and the Peshwas deteriorate beyond repair.  
 In 1743 Tulaji had succeeded Sambhaji as surkhail and a British 
chronicler states that around 1754, Angria no longer remitted his annual 
tribute to the Maratha state and that he “slit the noses” of the Maratha 
ambassadors who came to collect and sent them back empty handed.111 
Whether or not this last part is true, open hostility did not erupt between 
the Marathas and Tulaji until 1755. Despite the fact that two years earlier 
the Peshwa was reported to have stated he would not tolerate Tulaji any 
longer.112 Contrarily Tulaji and the Peshwa are also recorded to have co-
operated together on several occasions. Notwithstanding, it is clear that 
there were difficulties with the relationship.  
 In 1754 however, Tulaji suddenly initiated a peace proposal whose 
terms Bombay was not willing to accept and in response told Tulaji “Can 
you imagine that the English will ever submit to take the passes of any 
Indian Nation, this they cannot do; we grant Passes but take none from 
any body.”113 It could be that Angria was having continual trouble 
domestically and knew what was coming his way and so sought to pre-
emptively come to terms with the English. Regardless, peace between 
the two did not occur. 
 The following year in March the EIC was offered by Peshwa Balaji 
Baji Rao “to join forces with theirs and endeavour to subdue and 
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demolish Toolaji Angria.”114 Seizing the opportunity the Company readily 
agreed and it was decided the campaign should begin that summer. The 
English would provide a naval force in order to bombard the enemy’s 
fortresses as well as troops to be landed for a ground assault. The 
Marathas would make up the majority of the land forces and provide 
cavalry. “Without the loss of a Man”115 Angria’s fortress of Severndroog 
was taken by the joint force followed by Bancoote, which fell with hardly a 
fight.116 Another joint assault was planned for next year this time against 
Geriah.   
 The following February the Marathas and EIC converged on the 
fortress that had once been described as impenetrable. In an 
anticlimactic finish, Tulaji surrendered himself to the Maratha force of 
9000 men, leaving his brother-in-law to defend the fort.117 Commodore 
Charles Watson and Colonel Robert Clive, of later Plassey fame, 
commanded 1350 troops on land and sea.118 After an evening and 
morning of bombardment the fortress surrendered and was occupied by 
Clive’s men.  
 Before the military operation the English and Marathas had agreed 
on the division of spoils. The Marathas were to keep all land and forts in 
exchange for favourable trading privileges and the explicit exclusion of 
other European companies operating in Maratha territories.119 Manaji was 
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not involved in the engagements and was left in possession of his 
territory, but the Angria surkhail was disbanded. Tulaji died several years 
later while still in captivity.   
 Lakshmi Subramanian argues that the Angria dynasty fell due to 
the “incompetence of Kanhoji’s successors” but does not state how or 
why they were as such.120 Even the cursory history offered above of the 
reigns of Kanhoji’s sons demonstrate that they were far from incompetent. 
They were able to carry on enforcing Maratha sovereignty and continue 
to challenge successfully the Europeans. It was only when there were 
internal disputes within the Confederacy that Tulaji was eventually 
removed from power. The fact that it took a joint force of over 9000 troops 




 Taking the history of the Angrias within its wider geopolitical context 
reveals a much more nuanced story than has been previously narrated. 
As demonstrated here, Kanhoji and his sons were not pirate sovereigns 
yet they were authorities over the Konkan and its littoral. Why did the 
English persist in their misconception then of Angria as a pirate? One 
possible reason advanced by Malgonkar is that by labeling them as 
pirates the EIC could write off these losses under normal insurance 
contracts.121 Another possible explanation is that the EIC did not want to 
be seen as waging another war against an Indian empire. They had tried 
this in the late 17th century against the Mughals and it had ended poorly. 
Wars of conquest carried out by chartered private companies using public 
funds were not popular at home. The EIC did not want to stir up more 
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public discontent than it could help. These explanations beg the question, 
why did the Marathas let the EIC get away with challenging their 
indigenous sovereignty over the seas. The short answer is they did not. 
Angria was there to seek out English shipping and enforce Maratha 
claims on the coast. Furthermore, the Maratha state did send troops to 
the Konkan when Angria requested as in the case of subduing the Siddi. 
Furthermore, this history has shown the Angrias could handle themselves 
quite well against their enemies. Additionally, the Maratha state was 
almost constantly involved in wars of territorial expansion. There existed 
no benefit to opening up a full-scale war on another front against the 
English and had they done so the Company was bound to enter into an 
alliance with Maratha’s adversaries. No harm came to the Marathas for 
allowing the British to classify Angria as a sovereign pirate. Lastly, the 
English were good for trade. To remove them from the area or start an all 
out war would not have been good for anyone’s economy.  
 For the last 2000 years the western coast of India was infamous for 
endemic indigenous piracy.122 However, the only pirates of this sort 
mentioned during the tenure of the Angrias were the Angrias themselves.  
As this thesis demonstrated, they were not pirates at all but rather agents 
of the Maratha Confederacy who enforced the cartaz to gain revenue and 
exercise sovereignty.  There exist no other accounts of maritime 
predation occurring from Indians in the region during the early 18th 
century. It stands to reason that the possibility exists that the Angrias 
were so effective in securing their littoral that piracy, once a real problem 
in the region, was all but eradicated.   
 The case of the Angrias demonstrates just how vulnerable the 
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British position was in pre-colonial India. The Company could influence 
regional politics but could not dictate them. The Angrias, as servants of 
the state, articulated themselves politically through the issue and 
enforcement of the cartaz, which brought them into conflict with their 
neighbours. The ensuing struggles for political recognition and regional 
hegemony created a complex environment of negotiation and unlikely 
alliances. What is demonstrated is the reality of early interaction of global 
powers where there were no foregone conclusions.  Europeans may have 
possessed superior military technology yet Indians possessed 
comparative advantages in other areas that made them formidable 
adversaries or welcome allies.   
 Indeed, it appears that only until the EIC could enlist the assistance 
of the local indigenous power was it able to effectively coerce other 
regional polities. By definition pirates are not regional state authorities. 
Continuing to apply such terms in an universalist misconceived manner 
has only persisted in faulty analyses and understandings of a more global 
cosmopolitan phenomenon. Treating the Angrias as nothing more than 
maritime predators has incorrectly influenced generations of scholarship 
on Konkan history and has hidden a much more interesting and nuanced 
story.   
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